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Ethos, Pathos & Legal Audience
Michael Frost*
I. Introduction
When preparing their arguments, modem lawyers sometimes fail to
consider how their own credibility or the emotional aspects of their case
affects a judge or jury. Instead, they generally focus most of their
attention on the substantive and logical integrity of their arguments.
They are far more interested in logical and organizational coherence than
in the emotional climate within which they argue or in their own
credibility while arguing a case. By focusing as they do on logic and
organization, they often ignore the importance of two especially effective
nonrational means of persuading judges and juries to accept their
arguments: emotional appeals based on the facts of the case or the
decisionmaker's personality and their own personal appeal or credibility.
Although treatises on appellate advocacy and other general advocacy
treatises sometimes discuss the part that emotion and lawyer credibility
play in persuasive discourse,' the fullest treatment of the topic appears
in trial advocacy treatises. Trial advocacy treatises and manuals usually
discuss how emotion and lawyer credibility play an important part in
persuading courts and juries to the lawyer's point of view.2 And, in their
periodical literature and journals, trial lawyers frequently remind one
another, formally and informally, that legal arguments are not won solely
on the basis of logical consistency and substantive merits and that
*Associate Professor of Legal Writing, Southwestern University School of Law. Ph.D. English,
State University of New York, Binghamton. I wish to thank Prof. Christine Mettem and Prof.
Richard Solomon for their helpful suggestions on early drafts of this article and Southwestern
University School of Law for a summer research grant which helped me complete the article.
1. Appellate advocacy treatises focus on these topics with a judicial audience in mind, whereas
trial advocacy texts focus on both judicial and jury audiences. Appellate advocacy texts deal with
the subject of lawyer credibility by focusing on the advocate's command of substantive matters or
by emphasizing the advocate's "professionalism" and personal "style." Although they sometimes
discuss emotion in connection with the statement of the case, the subject is not treated in much detail.
For a representative sampling of appellate advocacy books treating these matters see, BOARD
OF STUDENT ADVISERS, HARvARD LAW SCHOOL, INTRODucnON TO ADVOCACY 140 (4th ed. 1985);
CHARLEs R. CALLEROS, LEGAL METHOD AND WRITING 370 (1990); WESLEY GILMER, JR., LEGAL
RESEARCH, WRITniG AND ADVOCACY 258 (1987); KAREN K. PORTER ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO
LEGAL WRITING AND ORAL ADVOACY 175 (1989); EDWARD D. RE, BRIEF WRITING AND ORAL
ARGUMENT 167 (5th ed. 1983); HELENE A. SHAPO ET AL., WRITING AND ANALYsIs IN THE LAw 281
(2nd ed. 1991); and UCLA MOOT COURT HONORS PROGRAM, HANDBOOK OF APPELLATE ADVOCACY
36 (1993).
2. "[C]redibility is the only thing a lawyer has to sell." THOMAS MAUEr, FUNDAMENTALS OF
TRIAL TECHNQUES 46, 48 (3rd ed. 1992).
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intangible factors often affect the outcome. The trial bar clearly
understands that legal arguments must be tailored to suit various
audiences and that this skill must be learned and practiced. Their interest
in audience is reflected in everything from elaborate jury selection
techniques and discussions regarding the proper way to manage exhibits
to anecdotal exchanges of information about how judges or juries respond
to particular arguments and lawyers. By focusing as they do on the
importance of emotion and lawyer credibility, modem trial lawyers,
perhaps instinctively, are relying on time-honored persuasive techniques
that Greek and Roman philosophers, lawyers, and rhetoricians described,
analyzed, and used more than 2,000 years ago.
A. Classical Rhetoric
Aristotle's Rhetoric is the earliest authoritative analysis of persuasive
discourse and argumentative techniques and is the source of most Roman
treatises on the topic.' The Roman treatises, principally by Cicero and
Quintilian, were written for inexperienced advocates or for anyone who
might sometime argue a case in court.4 The treatises were not written
solely for lawyers or students but were intended for use by all members
of the educated classes.5 In effect, they were practice manuals replete
with examples drawn from famous cases. They described the analytical
methodology and practice of experienced lawyers and, for the most part,
were descriptive, rather than prescriptive, in force. With varying degrees
of success, these treatises systematized legal analysis and suggested ways
of effectively organizing and presenting commonplace arguments.
Roman rhetoricians and lawyers like Cicero and Quintilian, relying
on Aristotle's rhetorical analyses, divided persuasive discourse, and legal
arguments in particular, into three categories: logical argument (logos),
emotional argument (pathos), and ethical appeal or credibility (ethos).6
3. In this Article, the term "rhetoric" sometimes refers to a rhetorical treatise written by a
Greek or Roman author. Rhetoric is also used in the Aristotelian sense of being the "faculty [power]
of discovering in the particular case what are the available means of persuasion." ARISTOTLE, THE
RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE 7 (Lane Cooper trans., 1932).
4. In addition to serving these functions, classical rhetorical treatises also described a
comprehensive educational curriculum and provided instruction on public speaking for ceremonial
and political occasions.
5. For a fuller description of the typical treatise-user see MARIUS FABIUS QUINTILIAN,
INSTITtyrIO ORATORIA 5-19 (H.E. Butler trans., 1954); Susan Miller, Classical Practice and
Contemporary Basics, in THE RHETORICAL TRADITION AND MODERN WRITING 46 (James J. Murphy
ed., 1982); Donovan J. Ochs, Cicero's Rhetorical Theory, in A SYNOPTIC HISTORY OF CLASSICAL
RHETORIC 96 (James J. Murphy ed., 1983).
6. Classical rhetoricians created these divisions for purposes of analysis and discussion, but
did not consider logos, pathos, and ethos as completely separable from one another. Each part is
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Both Quintilian and Cicero extended and amplified points Aristotle had
made in his Rhetoric7 regarding the effect that emotion and lawyer
credibility have on a judge or jury's receptivity to lawyers' arguments.
What distinguishes the Greek and Roman analyses of legal discourse
from modem analyses is their consistent focus on audience, the depth and
detail of their analysis, and their candid discussions of how to manipulate
judges and juries. Based on their close observations of human nature and
on their own considerable experience in arguing cases, Greco-Roman
rhetoricians composed comprehensive treatises which analyzed persuasive
discourse in great detail. Because they thought emotional arguments and
lawyer credibility were critically important to persuading legal audiences,
they devoted fully as much attention to those aspects of persuasive
discourse as they did to logical, definitional, or organizational aspects.
They were especially interested in the interplay between various types of
argument and the manner in which advocates make them and were
acutely conscious that good legal arguments can fail because advocates
disregard the nonrational factors which affect persuasive discourse. A
comparison of Greco-Roman and modem analyses of the part ethos and
pathos play in legal argument reveals not only that the classical materials
are more comprehensive in scope but also that they are as relevant today
as they were 2,000 years ago.
Classical rhetoricians, beginning with Aristotle, constantly remind
their readers of the importance of remembering their audience. In his
Rhetoric, Aristotle observes that,
the individual man is as truly a judge or decider as an entire audience;
so, in the wider sense, whoever it is you have to persuade is "judge
...." [Y]ou compose your speech for an audience, and the audience
is the "judge." As a rule .. .the term "judge" means simply and
solely one of the persons who decide the issue in the disputes of civil
life, where, as in law-suits, there is a question of fact to be settled, or,
as in deliberations of State, a question of policy
However, although Aristotle emphasizes the importance of audience he
does not always hold a very high opinion of their legal acumen, analytical
connected to and helps define the others. ARISTOTLE, supra note 3, at 8.
"There are... three aims which the orator must always have in view; he must instruct, move,
and charm his hearers." QUINTILIAN, supra note 5, at 397 (H.E. BUTLER trans., 1954). Marius
Fabius Quintilian (circa 35-95 A.D.) was a Roman teacher of public speaking and rhetoric whose
major rhetorical work is INSTITUI~O ORATORIA. Marcus Tullius Cicero (circa 106-45 B.C.) was a
Roman statesman, lawyer, and teacher whose major works on rhetoric include DE ORATORE (E.W.
Sutton trans., 1942) BRUTUS, and ORATORE.
7. ARISTOTLE, supra note 3.
8. Id. at 141.
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abilities, or fairness. In fact, much of his advice regarding persuasive
discourse is based on the assumption that legal audiences are
insufficiently educated and trained and overly susceptible to emotional
arguments and charming advocates.9
B. Greco-Roman Audiences
The Roman rhetoricians shared Aristotle's general skepticism
regarding the capabilities of judges and juries to decide a case properly.
In large part, their skepticism arose from the fact that in both Greek and
Roman systems, the judges who usually heard routine civil cases were not
professional jurists but regular citizens, frequently drawn from the
senatorial class, who heard only a few cases in their entire lifetimes.' °
Under Roman law, for example,
[t]he trial of an action under the legis actio procedure . . . was
characterized by a remarkable division of the proceedings into two
states, the first of which took place before the magistrate, under
whose supervision all the preliminaries were arranged, while the
second in which the issue was actually decided, was held before a
iudex (judge), who was neither a magistrate nor a professional lawyer,
but a layman agreed on by the parties and appointed by the
magistrate."
Most judges were amateurs because "it was a part of the philosophy
of the Romans that the duty of a citizen included taking his share of the
burdens of the law: acting as judge, arbitrator or juror and supporting his
friends in their legal affairs by coming forward as witness, surety and so
on."' 2  Most judges, acting out of a sense of noblesse oblige, "were
members of the Roman upper class, for even public and political office
were only incidents in lives of leisure, and it was therefore an amateur
activity just as much as being a historian or an agricultural expert.,' 3
9. Aristotle wrote that, "Nevertheless, as we have said, external matters do count for much,
because of the sorry nature of an audience." Id. at 193-94.
10. "At Rome, most private suits were heard by a single judge, the iudex privatus or arbiter."
GEORGE KENNEDY, THE ART OF RHETORIC IN THE ROMAN WORLD 198 (1972).
"Each iudex was appointed to serve only in a particular case, some might have been called on
frequently; when called on it was their duty to serve, for the office of iudex was a public office
which could be declined only for valid reasons." Id. at 231.
11. H.F. JOLOwIcz & BARRY NICHOLAS, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN
LAw 176 (1972).
12. JOHN ANTHONY CROOK, LAW AND LIFE OF ROME 33 (1967). See also BRUCE W. FRIER,
THE RISE OF THE ROMAN JURISTS: STUDIES IN CICERO'S PRO CAECINA 96 (1985), where the
author notes that, "The normal judge in a Roman civil case was emphatically not a legal professional,
nor even a magistrate, but instead a layman with no special training in the law."
13. CROOK, supra note 12, at 89.
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Although most cases were heard by a single judge, "many [notorious
or important] civil actions went before a much bigger jury, the Court of
One Hundred, centumviri . . . . The centumviri had no exclusive
competence in any particular field; inheritances, for example, could
equally well go before a single iudex (judge)."'4 Sometimes, in the case
of international disputes, cases of particular urgency, or social
importance, a panel of judges known as recuperatores heard the case. 5
Given the amateur status of both the judges and juries who decided
legal disputes, Greek and Roman rhetoricians understandably stressed
persuasive techniques based on emotional arguments and the advocate's
personal credibility instead of relying solely on legal arguments. Much
of their assessment of what would persuade judges and juries was
grounded in basic human psychology rather than jurisprudential
philosophy or statutory law. Consequently, throughout their works, they
emphasized rhetorical and psychological strategy as much as they do legal
strategy. Pathos and ethos were at the heart of all their analyses of
persuasive discourse.
II. Pathos
A. Emotion and Argument
In his Rhetoric, the preeminent rhetorical treatise of the classical
period, Aristotle consistently analyzed legal arguments in terms of both
rational and nonrational or affective methods of persuading an audience.
The Rhetoric examines legal arguments in terms of "human nature, with
its ways of reasoning, its habits, desires, and emotions."'" In effect, the
treatise is a "practical psychology,"' 7 which provides a detailed
examination of human nature as the Greeks and Romans understood it.
Although Aristotle's psychological assumptions may occasionally
strike modem readers and professional psychologists as somewhat
mechanistic and over-simplified, they are nonetheless grounded on astute
observations of how hate, love, pity, anger, impatience, boredom, and
inattentiveness affect a judge or jury's reasoning abilities and legal
decisions. Any short-comings attributable to Aristotle's "mechanistic"
psychology are more than compensated for by his close analysis of the
interplay between emotion and argument and his detailed advice
regarding how to measure an audience and manipulate its emotions.
14. Id. at 79-80.
15. KENNEDY, supra note 10, at 198-99.
16. ARISTOTLE, supra note 3, at xxi.
17. Id. at xvii.
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To begin with, Aristotle and the other rhetoricians decry the effect
emotions may have on judges, but grudgingly concede that, since they
often have a profound effect, advocates must exploit them whenever
possible. For example, near the beginning of his Rhetoric, Aristotle says
that "the man who is to judge should not have his judgment warped by
speakers arousing him to anger, jealousy, or compassion. One might just
as well make a carpenter's rule crooked before using it as a measure."'"
Nonetheless, he later notes that while "strict justice . . . would lead
us... to seek no more [of an emotional effect] than that we should
avoid paining the hearer without alluring him" and that "the case should,
in justice, be fought on the strength of the facts alone
[n]evertheless. . . external matters do count for much, because of the
sorry nature of an audience."' 9 Quintilian made a similar point while
explaining that the purpose of emotional arguments is not simply to play
on the court's emotions but also to provide adequate emphasis for
emotionally sympathetic facts:
Meanwhile I will content myself with the observation that the aim of
appeals to emotion is not merely to shew the bitter and grievous
nature of ills that actually are so, but also to make ills which are
usually regarded as tolerable seem unendurable .... For the force
of eloquence is such that it not merely compels the judge to the
conclusion toward which the nature of the facts lead him, but awakens
emotions which either do not naturally arise from the case or are
stronger than the case would suggest.2"
When discussing how emotions affect arguments, Aristotle and his
successors took it as a commonplace that,
the same thing does not appear the same to men when they are
friendly and when they hate, nor when they are angry and when they
are in gentle mood; in these different moods the same thing will
appear either wholly different in kind, or different as to magnitude."'
18. Id. at 2.
19. Id. at 183-84. See also QuINTLIAN, 2 INSTITUTMO ORATORIA 155 (H.E. Butler trans.,
1954), "There have been certain writers of no small authority who have held that the sole duty of
the orator was to instruct in their view appeals to the emotions were to be excluded for two reasons,
first on the ground that all disturbance of the mind was faulty, and secondly that it was wrong to
distract the judge from the truth by exciting his pity, bringing influence to bear, and the like.
Further, to seek to charm the audience, when the aim of the orator was merely to win success, was
in their opinion not only superfluous for a pleader, but hardly worthy of a self-respecting man."
20. QuwINTILAN, supra note 19, at 431 (emphasis added).
21. ARiSTOThE, supra note 3, at 91. Elsewhere Aristotle observes that, "[a]ppeals to the hearer
aim at securing his good will, or at arousing his anger; sometimes at engaging his attention, or, on
occasion, at diverting it-since engaging it is not always an advantage, and for that reason a speaker
will often try to set his audience laughing." Id. at 223.
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Aristotle's frank recommendation that advocates deliberately try to
manipulate a judge and jury's emotions is echoed by subsequent
rhetoricians. Cicero, for instance, emphasized the importance of emotions
when he observed that one "potent factor" in the successful argument of
a case is "the feelings of the tribunal ... [which must] be won over, as
far as possible, to goodwill towards the advocate and the advocate's client
as well."22 He too recommended playing on the court's emotions and,
like Aristotle, suggested that advocates speak in a way which "excites and
urges the feelings of the tribunal towards hatred or love, ill-will or well-
wishing, fear or hope."23  Quintilian, Cicero's greatest admirer, made
similar recommendations, primarily because he thought that emotional
arguments have the greatest appeal of all. In fact, he claimed that, "this
emotional power ... dominates the court[;] it is this form of eloquence
that is queen of all." '24 And, like Aristotle, he'thought that "the duty of
the [advocate] is not merely to instruct: the power of eloquence is
greatest in emotional appeals." '25
Aristotle and the other rhetoricians not only identified a few
emotions (hate, love, anger, fear, hope, pity) as being especially powerful
in creating persuasive arguments, they also thought that judges and juries
reacted to those emotions in predictable ways.26 It is here that the
Greco-Roman analysis seems overly simplistic. Cicero, for instance,
thought that "love" is won based primarily on the justness of the
advocate's cause or the court's own self-interest:
[S]ince the emotions which eloquence has to excite in the minds of
the tribunal . . . are most commonly love, hate, wrath, jealousy,
compassion, hope, joy, fear or vexation, we observe that love is won
if you are thought to be upholding the interests of your audience, or
See also QUINTILIAN, supra note 19, at 419-21, "[A]s soon as Budges] begin to be angry, to
feel favourably disposed, to hate or pity, they begin to take a personal interest in the case, and just
as lovers are incapable of forming a reasoned judgement... so the judge, when overcome by his
emotions, abandons all attempt to enquire into the truth of the arguments, is swept along by the tide
of passion, and yields himself unquestioning to the torrent."
22. MARCUs TULLIUS CICERo, DE ORATORE 327 (E.W. Sutton trans., 1942).
23. Id. at 331.
24. QUINTIL1AN, supra note 19, at 419.
25. Id. at 139.
26. Id. at 13. In several places, Quintilian hinted at some of the techniques he used to stir the
court's emotions: "Sometimes it is desirable to set forth [the client's] merits .... Sex, age and
situation are also important considerations, as for instance, when women, old men or wards are
pleading in the character of wives, parents or children. Forpity alone may move even a strict judge."
Id.
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to be working for good men, or at any rate for such as that audience
deems good and useful."
Quintilian made a similar observation when he generalized about
how a defendant's class or behavior provokes the court's jealousy, hatred,
or anger. He asserted that 'Yealousy will be produced by the influence of
the accused, hatred by the disgraceful nature of his conduct, and anger
by his disrespec(ful attitude toward the court."28
Quintilian may have overstated his case by suggesting that the
defendant's cause or rank or conduct always produces the same emotions
in the judge. Nevertheless, his analysis of how to manipulate the judge's
emotions was based on his own considerable experience as an advocate.
Notwithstanding their oversimplistic and somewhat dogmatic analyses,
both Cicero and Quintilian were primarily interested in calling attention
to the play of emotions that is present in every trial and making
suggestions about how to control those emotions.
B. Emotions and the Character of the Judge
Both rhetoricians were more on point, however, when they relied on
their observations about "human nature" to predict how judges would
react to arguments or when they recommended investigating the character
of the judge when preparing a case. Before beginning a case, Cicero
always carefully investigated the character and predispositions of the
court:
when setting 'about a hazardous and important case, in order to
explore the feelings of the tribunal, I engage wholeheartedly in a
consideration so careful, that I scent out with all possible keenness
their thoughts, judgements, anticipations and wishes, and the direction
in which they seem likely to be led away most easily by eloquence. 9
Quintilian also recommended learning as much as possible about the
"character" of the judges. To increase his chances of success, Quintilian
thought it was "desirable to enlist [the judges'] temperaments in the
service of our cause, where they are such as like to be useful, or to
mollify them, if they are like to prove adverse, just according as they are
harsh, gentle, cheerful, grave, stem, or easy-going.'3 Quintilian's
analysis of judicial audience provides detailed suggestions on a variety of
points. He suggests, "[flor instance, in pleading for a man of good birth
27. CICERO, supra note 22, at 349.
28. QUINTILIAN, supra note 19, at 391 (emphasis added).
29. CICERo, supra note 22, at 331.
30. QUINTILIAN, supra note 19, at 15.
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we shall appeal to his (the judge's) own high rank, in speaking for the
lowly we shall lay stress on his sense of justice."'" Almost ruefully he
reminded advocates that "it would be folly for me to warn speakers not
to say or even hint anything against [the judge], but for the fact that such
things do occur."32
Although both Cicero and Quintilian began their case preparation by
finding out as much as possible about the judge who will hear the case,
their preparations did not end there. As experienced advocates and close
observers of human nature, both Cicero and Quintilian had fixed opinions
about typical judicial behavior and attitudes, and therefore, they offered
numerous suggestions about trial strategies.
Quintilian, for example, was especially sensitive to the judge's
temperament and needs during the course of the trial. "Above all it is
important, whenever we suspect that the judge desires a proof other than
that on which we are engaged, to promise that we will satisfy him on the
point fully and without delay. . .. ""
Elsewhere, he observed that, the judge is always in a hurry to reach
the most important point. If he has a patient disposition he will
merely make a silent appeal to the advocate, whom he will treat as
bound by his promise [to get to the point.] On the other hand, if he
is busy, or holds exalted position, or is intolerant by nature, he will
insist in no very courteous manner on [the advocate] coming to the
point."'
Quintilian also warned against boring the judge with all the available
arguments," against "dry repetition of facts" which may suggest the
advocate's lack of confidence in the judge's memory,36 and against
"over-elaboration" of arguments, a practice which usually makes judges
31. Id. at 15.
32. Id. at 11.
33. Id. at 147.
34. QumuAN, supra note 19, at 143. See also id. at 125-27, where Quintilian observed that
impatient judges especially dislike digressions in the statement of the facts because, "as soon as he
has heard the facts set forth in order, the judge is in a hurry to get to the proof and desires to satisfy
himself of the correctness of his impressions at the earliest possible moment. Further, care must be
taken not to nullify the effect of the statement by diverting the minds of the court to some other
theme and wearying them by useless delay."
35. "We must not always burden the judge with all the arguments we have discovered, since
by so doing we shall at once bore him and render him less inclined to believe us." Id. at 303.
36. "Mhe points selected for enumeration (in the closing argument) must be treated with weight
and dignity, enlivened by apt reflexions and diversified by suitable figures; for there is nothing more
tiresome than a dry repetition of facts, which merely suggests a lack of confidence in the judge's
memory." Id. at 383.
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suspect that the advocate is not confident about the argument." From
these remarks and others, Quintilian's experience in the courtroom
becomes clear, and his portrait of a typical judge strikes a familiar chord.
C. Emotion and Organization
Greco-Roman analysis of how judges react to the emotional aspects
of a case was also closely linked to their assumptions about the most
logical and persuasive way to organize arguments. Classical rhetoricians
divided legal arguments into five parts: Introduction (exordium),
Statement of Case (narratio), Argument Summary (partitio), Proof of the
Case (confirmatio), and Conclusion (peroratio).as
Based on their observation that effective discourse usually followed
predictable logical patterns, they described the function of each part and
discussed its connection to the overall argument. They did not, however,
limit their analysis to the logical and substantive interrelationships among
the parts, they also discussed the emotional effects appropriate to each
part and judges' tendencies to become impatient, bored, inattentive, or
distracted unless they are also emotionally engaged in the case.
1. Opening Statement.-Although Aristotle was skeptical about
whether advocates even needed to provide an exordium or introduction
for their arguments,39 he nonetheless noted that advocates can use the
introduction to make the "audience receptive. '  Subsequent
rhetoricians, however, attached more importance to introductions. Cicero
thought that emotion was "especially important in the exordium; it is
essential that [the exordium] should have the power of stirring the minds
of the audience ... [because it has] a very great effect in persuading and
arousing emotion."' He also noted that arousing the judge's emotions
is "easier in the introduction, because the audience [is] most attentive
when [it has] the whole of the speech to look forward to, and also [it is]
more receptive at the start" because the advocate's position is usually
clearer at the beginning than in the middle of the argument.42
37. Id. at 343.
38. For a fuller analysis of this topic, see Michael Frost, Brief Rhetoric-a Note on Classical
and Modern Theories of Forensic Discourse, 38 KAN. L. REV. 411 (Winter 1990).
39. ARISTOTLE, supra note 3, at 224. "But we must not forget that such things (as
introductions) are, every one of them, extraneous to a speech. They are for the audience, an audience
that is weak enough to accept utterances beside the point; and if audiences were not what they are,
there would be no need of any proem (opening statement) beyond a summary statement of the matter
in question ......
40. Id. at 223 (emphasis added).
41. CICERo, supra note 22, at 435.
42. Id. at 443.
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Like Cicero, Quintilian thought that the introduction exercised a
"valuable influence in winning the judge to regard us with favor."'43
Quintilian also suggested that advocates should use a temperate or low-
key delivery in their introduction. "[]n our opening any preliminary
appeal to the compassion of the judge must be made sparingly and with
restraint." And, to pique and maintain an impatient judge's interest,
he suggested that advocates should "create the impression that [they] shall
not keep [the judge] long and intend to stick closely to the point ....
The mere fact of such attention makes the judge ready to receive
instruction from [them], but [they] shall contribute still more to this effect
if [they] give a brief and lucid summary of the case which [they have] to
try.''45
2. Statement of the Case.-In contrast to his skepticism about the
usefulness of exordia, Aristotle was very enthusiastic about the persuasive
value of the Statement of the Case or narratio. Aristotle thought that the
Statement of the Case offered advocates a unique opportunity for creating
a favorable impression of their clients and he made numerous suggestions
about how to exploit this opportunity. He emphasized that, "[t]he
narration should depict the ethos (character) [of the client]. One thing
that will give this quality is the revelation of moral purpose; for the
quality of the ethos is determined by the quality of the purpose revealed,
and the quality of this purpose is determined by its end."'
The most comprehensive analysis of ways to exploit the emotional
or affective content of the Statement of the Case comes from Quintilian
who thought that, "the purpose of the statement of the facts is not merely
to instruct, but rather to persuade the judge."' 7  Quintilian made the
familiar observations about the importance of clarity, conciseness, and
43. QUiNTlLIAN, supra note 19, at 18.
44. Id. at 21.
45. Id. at 25.
46. ARISTOTLE, supra note 3, at 230. Aristotle's advice even extended to small details of
wording as when he observed, "things that impart character are the traits that belong to each type;
thus: 'Still talking, on he went'-which reveals the type of blusterer and boor." Id. at 231. And,
later, he advised advocates to "employ the traits of emotion. Use symptoms familiar to all, and any
special signs of emotion in the defendant or his adversary. For example: 'With a scowl, he left me'
.... These touches carry conviction; the hearer knows them, and, to him, they evince the truth of
what he does not know." Id.
47. QUJNTILIAN, supra note 19, at 61.
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relevance in the statement of the case,4 but also added warnings against
excessive concision,
We must avoid . terseness .. and shun all abruptness of speech,
since a style which presents no difficulty to a leisurely reader, flies
past a hearer and will not stay to be looked at again; and whereas the
reader is almost always a man of learning, the judge often comes to
his panel from the country side and is expected to give a decision on
what he can understand.49
He also warned against tediousness and offered suggestions about how to
avoid it: "[d]ivision of our statement into its various heads is another
method of avoiding tedium . . . . Such a division will give the
impression of... short statements rather than [a] long one."50
Finally, in keeping with his conviction that emotion, more than logic
or justice, is the primary ground on which cases are decided, Quintilian
focused on emotion's place in the narratio. He stressed, for instance, that
"there is no portion of a[n] [argument] at which the judge is more
attentive, and consequently nothing that is well said is lost. And the
judge is, for some reason, or other, all the more ready to accept what
charms his ear and is lured by pleasure to belief."'" And, in rebuttal of
those who discounted the importance of the statement of the case, he
said,
I am... surprised at those who hold that there should be no appeal
to the emotions in the statement of the facts .... [W]hy, while I am
instructing the judge, should I refuse to move him as well? Why
should I not, if it is possible, obtain that effect at the very opening of
the case which I am anxious to secure at its conclusion, more
especially in view of the fact that I shall find the judge far more
amenable to the cogency of my proof, if I have previously filled his
mind with anger or pity?52
48. "We shall achieve lucidity and clearness in our statement of the facts, first by setting forth
our story in words which are appropriate, significant and free from any stain of meanness, but not
on the other hand farfetched or unusual, and secondly by giving a distinct account of facts, persons,
times, places and causes, while our delivery must be adapted to our matter, so that the judge will take
in what we say with the utmost readiness." Id. at 69-71.
Quintilian advises in another passage, "The statement of facts will be brief, if in the first place
we start at that point of the case at which it begins to concern the judge, secondly avoid irrelevance,
and finally cut out everything the removal of which neither hampers the activities of the judge nor
harms our own case." Id. at 73.
49. Id. at 75 (emphasis added).
50. Id. at 77.
51. QUINTILIAN, supra note 19, at 115.
52. Id. at I11.
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3. Argument Summary, Argument, Closing Argument.-When
discussing the argument summary (partitio) and the argument itself
(confirmatio), classical rhetoricians understandably focused more on the
logic and substantive coherence of the argument than on its emotional
content. Even so, like Cicero, they thought that "all arguments must be
rounded off either by enlarging on your points or by arousing the feelings
of the judge or calming them down."53
Quintilian suggested that while an argument summary sometimes
allays a judge's fears54 or makes him more attentive and receptive,"
it should be omitted if the advocate will be making unique or unpopular
arguments,
Sometimes we shall even have to hoodwink the judge and work upon
him by various artifices so that he may think that our aim is other
than what it really is. For there are cases when a proposition may be
somewhat startling: if the judge foresees this, he will shrink from it
in advance, like a patient who catches sight of the surgeon's knife
before the operation. On the other hand, if we have given him no
preliminary notice and our words take him unawares, without his
interest in them having been previously roused by any warning, we
shall gain a credence which we should not have secured had we stated
that we were going to raise the point.56
Despite their disagreements about the necessity or usefulness of
argument summaries, classical rhetoricians all agreed that the closing
argument or peroration was an extremely important place for exploiting
the emotional content of the case. Aristotle said that an advocate should
use his closing argument to "put the audience in the right state of
emotion" and that the advocate should "make the audience feel the right
53. CicERO, supra note 22, at 449 (emphasis added). See also QUINTILIAN, supra note 19, at
417, "There is scope for an appeal to the emotions.., in every portion of a speech" (emphasis
added).
54. "For it not only makes our arguments clearer by isolating the points from the crowd in
which they would otherwise be lost and placing them before the eyes of the judge, but relieves his
attention by assigning a definite limit to certain parts of our speech .... For it is a pleasure to be
able to measure how much of our task has been accomplished, and the knowledge of what remains
to do stimulates us to fresh effort over the labour that still awaits us." QUINTILIAN, supra note 19,
at 149.
55. "Partition may be defined as the enumeration in order of our own propositions, those of our
adversary or both. It is held by some that this is indispensable on the ground that it makes the case
clearer and the judge more attentive and more ready to be instructed, if he knows what we are
speaking about and what we are going subsequently to speak about." Id. at 137.
56. Id. at 139.
99 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW FALL 1994
emotions-pity, indignation, anger, hatred, envy, emulation,
antagonism.""7
Quintilian concurred with Aristotle and maintained that "[tihe
peroration is the most important part of forensic pleading, and in the
main consists of appeals to the emotions.""8  Moreover, given its
placement at the end of the case, it "provides freer opportunities for
exciting the passions of jealousy, hatred, or anger."59  Although the
peroration also gives advocates a chance to refresh the judge's
memory,6 ° its principal purpose is to play on the feelings of the court:
[I]n the peroration we have to consider what the feelings of the judge
will be when he retires to consider his verdict, for we shall have no
further opportunity to say anything .... It is therefore the duty of
both parties to seek to win the judge's goodwill and to divert it from
their opponent, as also to excite or assuage his emotions ....6
Quintilian especially recommended using the peroration to play on the
fears of the court.62
In addition to analyzing the emotional content of legal arguments
and suggesting ways to manipulate the emotions of judges and juries,
these rhetoricians also offered technical advice about effective ways to
modulate the court's emotions. Aristotle noted that advocates vary their
emotional appeals depending on their purpose. "Appeals to the hearer
aim at securing his good will, or at arousing his anger; sometimes at
engaging his attention, or, on occasion, at diverting it-since engaging it
is not always an advantage . . . ." Cicero too noted that advocates
must vary the emotional climate of their argument according to need:
But closely associated with this [other style] is that dissimilar style of
speaking which, in quite another way, excites and urges the feeling of
the tribunal towards hatred or love, ill-will or well-wishing, fear or
57. ARISTOTLE, supra note 3, at 240.
58. QUINTILIAN, 2 INSTITTlIO ORATORIA 417.
59. Id. at 391.
60. ARISTOTLE, supra note 3, at 240. Aristotle said that advocates should use the epilogue to
"refresh their memories." See also QUINTILIAN, supra note 19, at 383, where Quintilian observes,
"There are two kinds of peroration, for it may deal either with facts or with the emotional aspect of
the case. The repetition and grouping of the facts... serves to both refresh the memory of the judge
and to place the whole of the case before his eyes ... 
61. QUINTILIAN, supra note 19, at 389.
62. Quintilian especially recommended using the peroration to play on the fears of the court.
See id. at 391 ("The appeal to fear.., occupies a more prominent place in the peroration than in
the exordium .... ). Id. at 391.
63. ARISTOTLE, supra note 3, at 223.
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hope... or by it they are prompted to whatever emotions are nearly
allied and similar to these passions . ...
Quintilian was more specific about just what approach should be
used in each part of the argument. He thought the exordium and
peroration were distinguishable in that,
in our opening any preliminary appeal to the compassion of the judge
must be made sparingly and with restraint, while in the peroration we
may give full rein to our emotions, place fictitious speeches in the
mouths of our characters, call the dead to life, and produce the wife
or children of the accused in court, practices which are less usual in
exordia.65
He also emphasized the strategic necessity of emphasizing emotional
connections between the statement of the facts and the closing argument:
[i]f you wait for the peroration to stir your hearer's emotions over
circumstances which you have recorded unmoved in your statement
of facts, your appeal will come too late. The judge is already familiar
with them and hears their mention without turning a hair, since he
was unstirred when they were first recounted to him. Once the habit
of mind is formed, it is hard to change it.66
As the foregoing analysis shows, classical rhetoricians regarded
pathos as one of the most important rhetorical tools in legal discourse.
While they sometimes decried its effects, they nonetheless thought
emotion was a critical tool for emphasizing sympathetic facts and for
determining how judges perceive those facts. Accordingly, they
developed a comprehensive system for using emotion to cultivate good-
will toward both advocates and their clients. This system included
suggestions about which emotions to use for particular causes of action,
particular classes of clients, and particular kinds of conduct. It also
stressed the necessity of thoroughly investigating the judge's background
and predispositions and of sensitivity to the judge's emotional fluctuations
during the course of the trial.
According to classical rhetoricians, the emotional component plays
an important part throughout the argument, but plays slightly different
roles depending on whether it appears in the opening statements (proem
or exordium), the statement of the case (narratio), the argument itself
(confirmatio), or in closing argument (peroratio). Opening statements
64. CICERO, supra note 22, at 331.
65. QUINTILIAN, supra note 19, at 21.
66. Id. at 111.
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and the statement of the case should create a good first impression of the
advocate, disclose the client's good character, and show the justness of
his cause. Closing arguments are important for establishing a favorable
emotional climate just before the judge retires to reach a decision and for
refreshing his memory of sympathetic facts and arguments.
Flexibility is a key theme throughout their analysis. Each emotion
has a particular purpose and must suit the particular context in which it
appears and, above all, it must suit the audience to whom it is addressed.
Given the amount of space and detailed, systematic analysis devoted to
the subject of pathos, classical rhetoricians clearly thought it played an
important part in persuasive discourse.
1II. Ethos
Under classical theory, effective persuasive discourse depended
almost as much on the advocate's character and credibility, or ethos, as
it did on logical integrity (logos) or emotional content (pathos).
Moreover, for Aristotle, and for Cicero and Quintilian after him,
projecting the proper ethos is as important as actually possessing it;
the speaker must not merely see to it that his [argument] shall be
convincing and persuasive, but he must give the right impression of
himself.... This is [especially] true in forensic speaking.. .; [F]or
in conducing to persuasion it is highly important that the speaker
should evince a certain character, and that the judges should conceive
him to be disposed towards them in a certain way .... "
Given the importance he attached to projecting character or
credibility, Aristotle offered some pointed suggestions about how to
create the right impression, "[T]here are three things that gain our belief,
namely, intelligence, character, and good will . . . This being so, the
means by which one may give the impression of intelligence and good
character are to be found in our analysis of the virtues.
During his analysis of the virtues, Aristotle noted that affective or
emotional arguments (pathos) frequently depend on an advocate's ethos.
Accordingly, he advised advocates to exploit the connections between
pathos (emotion) and ethos (character or credibility) in order to make the
judge more attentive, "[Y]ou may use each and all of these means (of
emotional arguments).., with a view to making your audience receptive,
67. ARISTOTLE, supra note 3, at 91.
68. Id. at 92. The "virtues" Aristotle had in mind are best summarized in Cicero's list given
below. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
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and withal give an impression of yourself as a good and just man, for
good character always commands more attention."69
And, at the risk of appearing to encourage duplicity and trickery,
Aristotle warned advocates against inadvertently betraying their
manipulative intentions, "[P]resent yourself from the outset in a
distinctive light, so that the audience may regard you as a person of this
sort, your opponent as of that; only do not betray your design. It is easy
to give the right impression."7 All in all, Aristotle was convinced that
an advocate could manipulate the court's perception of his character as
effectively as he controlled its emotions or the logic of his own
arguments. Under Aristotle's analysis, ethos-control is as much an
acquired skill as it is an inherent characteristic of the advocate.
Both Cicero and Quintilian accepted and elaborated on Aristotle's
basic premises regarding the part ethos plays in persuasive discourse.
Like Aristotle, they emphasized projecting good character as much as
they did possessing it. And, like Aristotle, they seemed to sanction a
certain deliberate disingenuousness by advocates who want to disguise
their intentions. For instance, when Cicero listed virtues which contribute
to an attractive or convincing ethos,- "a mild tone, a countenance
expressive of modesty, [and] gentle language," he added that advocates
should also develop the "faculty of seeming to be dealing reluctantly and
under compulsion with something you are really anxious to prove."'"
Occasionally, Cicero offered specific advice on how to cultivate and
project the proper ethos. He believed, for instance, that,
much is done by good taste and style in speaking, [so] that the speech
seems to depict the speaker's character. For by means of particular
types of thought and diction, and the employment besides of a
delivery that is unruffled and eloquent of good nature, the speakers
are made to appear upright, well-bred and virtuous men.
72
However, ever mindful of the need to vary delivery depending on
audience and purpose, Cicero also stressed that, in order to be convincing,
advocates must sometimes abandon the restrained or temperate ethos and
adopt instead the passionate emotions they are trying to instill in their
audience:
69. Id. at 224.
70. Id. at 231 (emphasis added).
71. CICERO, supra note 22, at 327-29. Cicero offers a list of virtues the credible advocate
should project, "It is very helpful to display the tokens of good-nature, kindness, calmness, loyalty
and a disposition that is pleasing and not grasping or covetous, and all the qualities belong to men
who are upright, unassuming .... " Id. at 329.
72. Id.
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[lI]t is impossible for the listener to feel indignation, hatred or ill-will,
to be terrified of anything, or reduced to tears of compassion, unless
all those emotions, which the advocate would inspire in the arbitrator,
are visibly stamped or rather branded on the advocate himself.73
Cicero also noted that in a complex case an. advocate must frequently
vary his approach and intermingle temperate and passionate emotions.
7 4
According to Cicero, success in controlling these emotions and the court's
reaction depends on the technical skills and "personal urbanity of the
advocate."75
Quintilian approached the topic of ethos in much the same way as
his predecessors, Aristotle and Cicero. Like Aristotle, he believed that
"the strongest argument in support of a speaker is that he is a good
man." '76 And, like Cicero, he offered copious advice regarding how to
cultivate a convincing ethos. Quintilian thought that an advocate's
credibility depended mainly on his perceived motives for taking a
particular case: "It is . . . pre-eminently desirable that he should be
believed to have undertaken the case . . . [from a] moral
consideration."77 Credibility also depends on avoiding "the impression
that we are abusive, malignant, proud or slanderous toward any individual
or body of men, especially as cannot be hurt without exciting the
disapproval of the judges."78
73. Id. at 333 (emphasis added). But see, id. at 335, where Cicero made it clear that the
advocate's emotions must be genuine, not feigned: 'il]t is not easy to succeed in making an
arbitrator angry with the right party, unless he first sees you on fire with hatred yourself; nor will
he be prompted to compassion, unless you have shown him the tokens of your own grief by word,
sentiment, tone of voice, look and even by loud lamentation."
To illustrate this point, Cicero gave an example from one of his cases where "On seeing [his
client] cast down, crippled, sorrowing and brought to the risk of all he held dear, I was myself
overcome by compassion before I tried to excite it in others. Assuredly I felt that the Court was
deeply affected when I called forward my unhappy old client, in his garb of woe, and when I did
those things ... not by way of technique ... but under stress of deep emotion and indignation-I
mean my tearing open his tunic and exposing his scars." Id. at 339 (emphasis added).
74. "But these two styles, which we require to be respectively mild and emotional, have
something in common, making them hard to keep apart. For from that mildness, which wins us the
goodwill of our hearers, some inflow must reach this fiercest of passions, wherewith we inflame the
same people, and again, out of this passion some little energy must often be kindled within that
mildness: nor is any style better blended than that wherein the harshness of strife is tempered by the
personal urbanity of the advocate, while his easy-going mildness is fortified by some admixture of
serious strife." CICERO, supra note 21, at 355.
75. Id. at 355.
76. QUINTILIAN, supra note 19, at 303. Quintilian also observed that although an advocate
"may be modest and say little about himself, yet if he is believed to be a good man, this
consideration will exercise the strongest influence at every point of the case." Id. at 9.
77. Id. at 9.
78. Id. at 11.
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Quintilian, like the others, paid considerable attention to the
artfulness or skill needed to create credibility. One technique he
recommended was a kind of false humility, that is, "representing that we
are weak, unprepared, and no match for the powerful talents arrayed
against us."79  For maximum effect, this false humility can be
accompanied by a "certain simplicity in the thoughts, style, voice and
look of the speaker.""0
He also warned advocates against burdening "the judge with all the
arguments we have discovered since by so doing we shall at once bore
him and render him less inclined to believe us..' And, finally, to be
persuasive the advocate should present the entire case with an air of
confidence: "Our advocate must . . . adopt a confident manner, and
should always speak as if he thought his case admirable." 2
During his analysis of how an advocate's confidence creates
credibility, Quintilian repeated his predecessors' caveats regarding the
disingenuousnesswhich frequently accompanies persuasive discourse. He
pointed out the dangers of appearing too confident, "For as a rule [a]
judge dislikes self-confidence in a pleader, and conscious of his rights
tacitly demands the respectful deference of the orator.""3
Quintilian's advice about deliberately cultivating credibility and
maintaining appearances is accompanied by several warnings about the
adverse consequences of a judge discovering that an advocate has been
deceptive or insincere. He noted, first, that disguising artfulness is
extremely difficult "[t]o avoid all display of art in itself requires
consummate art." 4  Later, in reference to the statement of the facts,
Quintilian stressed how careful advocates must be:
It is ...specially important in this part of our speech to avoid
anything suggestive of artful design, for the judge is never more on
his guard than at this stage. Nothing must seem fictitious, nought
betray anxiety; everything must seem to spring from the case rather
than the art of the orator.85
79. Id. at 11.
80. QUINTILIAN, supra note 19, at 37.
81. Id. at 303. See also id. at 343, where Quintilian said, "There is another serious fault into
which pleaders fall: the anxious over-elaboration of points. Such a procedure makes his case suspect
to the judges, while frequently arguments which, if stated without more ado, would have removed
all doubt, lose their force owing to the delay caused by the elaborate preparations made for their
introduction, due to the fact that the advocate thinks that they require additional support."
82. Id. at 343.
83. Id. at 37.
84. QUINTILIAN, supra note 19, at 39.
85. Id. at 119.
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As the foregoing analysis shows, persuasive discourse depends as
much on the advocate's character and credibility (ethos) as it does on the
logic of the argument or the emotional content of the case. According to
Quintilian, the perfect orator is a good man speaking well.86 Under
classical analysis, the advocate's credibility depended primarily on the
perception that he took his case from good or moral considerations and
that he was completely confident in its outcome. It also depended on his
ability to convince the judge or jurors that he is intelligent, has goodwill
toward others, and is of upright character.
Given the importance of ethos, classical rhetoricians felt that
projecting the proper ethos was as important as actually possessing it.
For them, projecting the proper ethos was an acquired skill, an art that
disguised art. And, like the skillful manipulation of arguments or
emotions, it required flexibility and constant practice. They encouraged
advocates to look for ways to connect their ethos to the emotional
undercurrents of a case and to develop the ability to deliver arguments in
a restrained or an impassioned manner, depending on the circumstances.
If the occasion demanded it, they even sanctioned certain types of
disingenuousness by advocates, so long as their deceptions went
undetected. And, they illustrated how difficult it was to project and
control the proper ethos by showing how advocates lose their credibility
by over-elaboration of trivial arguments, by transparent over-confidence
or unseemly arrogance, or by being detected in a posture of false
humility. Throughout their discussion of ethos, classical rhetoricians
constantly reminded advocates that their success depended heavily on the
decisionmaker's perception of their character.
IV. Ethos and Pathos: The Modem View
When compared with the classical treatises, modem analysis of how
pathos and ethos affect legal audiences appears sketchy and widely
scattered. It lacks the overarching theoretical framework that the classical
rhetorical treatises provide. Although modem authorities discuss many of
the topics covered in the classical texts, they do so in a less
comprehensive and clearly organized fashion.
Notwithstanding these shortcomings, modem trial advocacy treatises,
practice manuals, and even recent law review articles periodically testify
to the enduring value of pathos and ethos in legal discourse. Occasional
references in various journals and treatises also demonstrate that audience
consciousness is just as important to modem trial lawyers as it was to
86. QUINTILIAN, supra note 5. at 9.
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Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian, especially since trial lawyers often argue
their cases before a dual and unpredictable audience comprised of an
amateur jury and a professional judge.
A modem trial lawyer's general approach to advocacy is similar to
the classical approach because trial lawyers argue their cases before lay
juries. In fact, modem experts occasionally cite Cicero and Quintilian
regarding various persuasion techniques." While these experts' explicit
reliance on classical sources is usually, and understandably, limited, the
major classical themes nonetheless survive, albeit in altered, and
sometimes diminished, form. They too stress the importance of emotion
and lawyer credibility as they analyze and describe overall trial strategy,
jury selection, opening statements, and closing arguments.
A. Modern Audience Assessment
Unlike Greek and Roman advocates who argued their cases before
judges who were inexperienced amateurs, modem advocates argue their
cases before both experienced, professional judges and inexperienced,
amateur juries. Consequently, their task of audience assessment is more
difficult. Nonetheless, modem experts' basic approach resembles that of
their classical predecessors since both emphasize the importance of
thoroughly investigating the prospective audience.
In the classical period, most litigants had the benefit of selecting a
judge who was mutually agreeable to both parties."8 By contrast,
modem advocates have little say in the matter and usually must argue
before whichever judge is assigned to the case.89 Moreover, whereas the
87. For a representative sampling, see Robert F. Hanley, Brush Up Your Aristotle, 12 LITIG.
39, No. 2 (Winter, 1986) (a regrettably short essay stressing both the accessibility and applicability
of the Greco-Roman rhetorical principles discussed in this Article); Anthony G. Amsterdam and
Randy Hertz, An Analysis of Closing Arguments to A Jury, 37 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 55 (1992)
(quotes Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian while analyzing rhetorical structure of closing arguments);
James J. Brosnahan, Overview. Basic Principles of Advocacy, in MASTER ADVOCATES' HANDBOOK
29 (D. Lake Rumsey, ed. 1986) (periodically quotes Cicero during essay); JEFFREY J. HARTJE &
MARK E. WILSON, LAwYERs' WORK 305 (1984) (quotes Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian in chapter
devoted to persuasive discourse).
88. JOLOWICZ & NICHOLAS, supra note I1, at 179, "Mhe appointment [of a judge] was ...
made by the magistrate, but ... he would in practice take account of the wishes of the parties, and
* . . would not force any particular [judge] on an unwilling party" (emphasis added).
See also, CROOK, supra note 92, at 78, "[W]e hear sometimes of humble [judges], chosen no
doubt by humble litigants. If the parties did not have anyone in particular in mind, or could not
agree, the praetor would propose names from the annual list of 'select jurors..."' (emphasis added).
89. In the Federal system, advocates must prove that a judge is biased before he or she can be
removed. In some states, advocates have a right to one peremptory challenge; thereafter, the
advocate must file an affadavit alleging cause. Advocates have greater latitude regarding judges
under some ADR procedures; that is, the parties may decide to hire a retired judge that is mutually
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classical advocate, faced with an amateur, inexperienced judge,
investigated the judge's personal qualities and background, the modem
advocate, faced with a professional judge, analyzes and investigates the
judge's professional background or track record. This investigation takes
many avenues but frequently revolves around questions like:
Is he plaintiff- or defense-oriented in personal injury cases? What kind
of judgments has he entered in similar civil cases? Do his trial rulings
have any particular bent? In criminal cases, is he prosecution- or
defense-minded? Does he have known attitudes in certain types of
cases? What sentencing disparity does he have between bench and
jury trials?90
While the process of investigating a judge's decision-making
predilections is undoubtedly supplemented by advocates' informal
inquiries about personal habits and traits, their overall focus is on the
judge's professional, rather than his or her personal, behavior. In this
respect, it differs from the classical practice.
This difference is also reflected in the fact that classical investigative
techniques and purposes are transformed in the modem era to focus on
jurors, rather than judges. In some ways, the modem jury selection
process resembles the Greco-Roman judge selection process. Instead of
selecting a mutually agreeable judge, however, modem advocates select
mutually agreeable jurors. The judge-oriented approach of the classical
period has been transformed to a "juror-centered"' approach in the
modem era. Despite these differences, both approaches emphasize the
importance of knowing the audience.
Armed with elaborate questionnaires and supported in some cases
with the research findings of social scientists, modem lawyers try to
determine "the ideal type of juror in a given case."'  To that end,
satisfactory.
90. MAUET, supra note 2, at 14; see also Brosnahan, supra note 87, at 30 ("The advocate
should know the background of the judge, what organizations he or she belonged to as a private
lawyer before going on the bench, what his or her professional experience was, and what attitudes
the judge has manifested since going on the bench. Argument should then be shaped as much as
possible to convince that particular judge [or judges].") and Peter Perlman, Jury Selection, in id. at
51 ("If you are unfamiliar with the judge who will try the case, find out how much latitude will be
allowed in asking questions [during voir dire], or if it will be the judge who asks all questions.").
Some professional news services even offer to sell lawyers "profiles" of judges, see advertisements
for Judicial Profiles, L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 10, 1993, at 7.
But see, J.P. Vero, Nine Secrets for Living with Judges, 17 LiTMG. 18 (1991). Vero, not
content with examining the professional record of the judge, pigeonholes judges according to "type"
and offers advice as to how to accomodate each type.
91. MAUET, supra note 2, at 376.
92. LAWRENCE A. DUBIN & THOMAS F. GUERNSEY, TRIAL PRACTICE 15 (1991). The authors
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advocates investigate what they regard as "predictors of likely attitudes:
age, education, employment history, residence history, marital and family
history, hobbies and interests, reading and television habits, [and
membership in] organizations. ' Occasionally, their investigation even
extends to assessments of jurors' "body language," "likability," and
predisposition to be a "leader or follower."'94
In the classical period, the principal purpose of this investigation was
to enable the advocate to tailor the argument to suit the judge. While this
"tailoring" function is retained in modem jury analysis and selection
practice, the process also benefits modem lawyers before the case even
begins because it helps them select sympathetic or neutral jurors and
disqualify unsympathetic or biased jurors.
In sum, modem advocates have a more difficult task of audience
assessment than their classical predecessors. Instead of investigating only
one type of audience, modem advocates must investigate two types--one
amateur (the jury) and one professional (the judge). When investigating
the professional audience (the judge), modem advocates focus on the
judge's professional, rather than his or her personal, background.
However, when investigating the jury, advocates modify the classical
practice and focus on the jurors' personal and professional background.
In doing so, they transform the judge-oriented approach of the classical
period to the jury-oriented approach of today.
V. Advocate Credibility
Since lawyer credibility is so important, most modem trial advocacy
treatises devote considerable attention to analyzing and listing "credibility
factors." According to one authority, "[t]he only thing a trial lawyer has
to sell to the jury is his credibility." '95 Most of these modem lists of
"credibility factors" resemble the lists of "virtues" referred to in Greco-
Roman analyses of ethos.
also note that, "The scientific selection of juries became popular in the early 1970's. Market
researchers developed methods for conducting mock trials and testing the salability of a case in much
the same way a product is tested before being distributed in the marketplace." Id.
93. MAUET, supra note 2, at 25.
94. Id. at 27. See also Perlman, supra note 90, at 50, for the proposition that, "There are
various proper and ethical means which provide lawyers information about prospective jurors. Many
jurisdictions provide jury lists which contain the jurors' names, addresses, marital status, children,
and occupations. Various public records may also be helpful. These include voter registration lists
and various cross-reference directories.
More sophisticated techniques include the use of expert handwriting analysts, market research
studies, and community attitude surveys. Such studies provide a juror matrix summary through
which the attitudes of various jurors are classified and assigned a probability rating."
95. MAUET, supra note 2, at 46.
99 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW FALL 1994
Modem authorities, for example, think that, "the principal attributes
of persuasive lawyers ...are expertise, trustworthiness, impartiality,
dynamism, similarity to jurors and personal attractiveness." '96 Beyond
this, "the image of you in the jurors' minds . . . should be one of
fairness, honesty, sincerity, courteousness and the desire for justice."'97
Important as these inherent personal qualities are, however, modem
experts also stress that the most persuasive advocates usually possess a
non-arrogant confidence in and enthusiasm for their cases. Consequently,
these experts suggest that advocates consciously demonstrate their
"enthusiasm about trying the case" '9S whenever possible. To be most
effective, an advocate's enthusiasm must also be coupled with a "total
conviction in [the] case and [an] unwavering committment to [the
client's] side."99  Generally speaking, modem experts' emphasis on
projecting enthusiasm and confidence recalls similar advice by Aristotle,
Cicero, and Quintilian.
The classical approach also emphasized the importance of projecting
the proper ethos. That is, persuasive discourse depends on showing the
audience that the advocate is intelligent, knowledgeable, honest and fair.
Classical authorities reluctantly conceded that advocates must sometimes
feign these qualities, either by assuming a false humility or by appearing
reluctant to make an argument they are in fact eager to make. But they
regarded false humility and feigned reluctance as exceptions to the
general emphasis on enthusiasm, confidence, and intelligence.
Modem authorities also recognize that credibility depends on
projecting the advocate's intelligence and knowledge of the law and the
case. They too think that appearing to be "fair" increases an advocate's
credibility:
First, appear interested in helping the jurors decide the case in a fair
manner, rather than just appearing as a partisan advocate. Second,
show fairness to all parties and witnesses."
Echoing the classical rhetoricians' advice regarding appearances,
modem experts suggest that advocates should, "strive to create an
96. Id. at 379.
97. DUBIN & GUERNSEY, supra note 92, at 20. Df CICERO, supra note 22, at 335 (Cicero
provides a similar list of advocates' "virtues."). See also supra note 71 and accompanying text.
98. MAUET, supra note 2, at 42.
99. Id. at 284. See also Stuart M. Speiser, Closing Argument in MASTER ADVOCATES'
HANDBOOK, supra note 87, at 236 ("The most compelling summations I have heard are those that
convey a deep personal conviction of [sic] the client's cause, coupled with exposition of the evidence
in light of the judge's final instructions.") (emphasis added).
100. DUBIN & GUERNSEY, supra note 92, at at 171 (emphasis added).
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atmosphere of sincerity--that you and your client are honest and moral
people. Throughout the trial, it is important to avoid exaggeration and
deception."'' In addition, many experts think that an advocate's
credibility is increased by the frank confession of a weakness in the case;
Some lawyers believe that volunteering their own weaknesses only
puts undue emphasis on those weaknesses. They feel that it is better
to let the opponent bring them out. This approach fails to recognize,
however, that over the course of the trial the only thing that a lawyer
has to sell is his credibility. Once the jurors feel that a lawyer is not
being honest and candid with them, that credibility is lost.'02
As the preceding analysis demonstrates, classical and modem
authorities agree that merely possessing the proper ethos or character is
not sufficient. The advocate must also take steps to insure that the
audience perceives or appreciates the fact that the advocate possesses it.
Although there are some small differences between the classical and
modem experts regarding which attributes or approaches affect
credibility, they nevertheless agree that persuasive discourse often
depends on lawyer credibility.
Even though classical and modem experts usually agree regarding
which factors affect an advocate's credibility, they disagree on the
importance of non-verbal communication. Classical rhetoricians usually
confined their remarks on this topic to a few observations about gestures,
mannerisms, and stance, whereas modem experts' psycho- and
sociological approach is much more comprehensive and ambitious.
In their discussions of nonverbal communication, modem analysts
frequently use the language of psychologists and elocution coaches:
"Since so little communication is grounded on bare word content, lawyers
must understand how kinesics (posture, gestures, movement, eye contact,
and use of space), paralinguistics (voice inflection) and personal
appearance affect whether verbal communication will be persuasive.'
0 3
101. Speiser, supra note 99, at 243; and Hon. James C. Hill, The Importance of Sincerity, in
MASTER ADVOCATES' HANDBOOK 13 (D. Lake Rumsey ed. 1986).
102. MAUET, supra note 2, at 48. See also DuBIN & GUERNSEY, supra note 92, at 40 ("[Y]ou
are usually better off revealing significant weaknesses before the opponent does. To allow opposing
counsel to raise damaging information runs the risk that the jury will feel you have unfairly attempted
to hide relevant information.") and Perlman, supra note 90, at 53 ("Exposing weaknesses and
mitigating their damaging effect frequently disarms the opponent. At the same time, it confirms your
sincerity and credibility.").
103. MAUET, supra note 2, at 379. See also DUBIN & GUERNSEY, supra note 92, at 42 ("The
pitch, pace, tone, and volume of your voice should convey credibility and sincerity.") (emphasis
added) and RONALD L. CARLSON & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, DYNAMICS OF TRIAL PRACTICE:
PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 75 (1989).
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According to these analysts, an advocate's credibility can depend on
intangibles as small as a smile;
Whether out of nervousness or aloofness, some lawyers forget such
friendly but important gestures as a smile. Let the jurors know that
you are a human being, that you have a sense of humor, and that no
matter how important your client's case is to you, you still can
remember the basic courtesies which people should extend to one
another."4
Given their assumption that an advocate's credibility and personal
rapport with the audience depends on nonverbal communication, modem
experts commonly stress even small details, such as when to maintain
good eye contact,'0° where to stand while addressing the jury,' and
why it is inadvisable to read the argument.'0 7 They are convinced that
attention to details such as these will ingratiate advocates with their
audience and make their arguments more persuasive.
This modem emphasis on nonverbal factors which affect an
advocate's credibility and rapport with the audience is far different from
the classical emphasis on the advocate's character and personal integrity.
At its most simplistic, the modem approach resembles a course in
advanced elocution. It reduces ethos to common courtesy and careful
staging. At best, it equates ethos with general competence or
professionalism.
In most respects, modem and classical authorities agree on the
importance of lawyer credibility. They agree regarding which personal
qualities are most important, on which attitudes must be conveyed, and
even, in some cases, on which techniques are most effective. And,
finally, they agree that projecting personal integrity is as important as
actually possessing it.
104. Robert J. Jossen, Opening Statements, in MASTER ADVOCATES' HANDBOOK, supra note 87,
at 69.
105. Robert Jossen advises practitioners to "Look at the jurors.. . and show them that you care
about them as well as about your case. It is important to look at as many different jurors as possible
...; do not devote all of your attention to one or two individuals." See also Perlman, supra note
90, at 54 ("[Clounsel must maintain eye contact with the jury .... ") (emphasis added) and DUBIN
& GUERNSEY, supra note 92, at 173 ("Reading notes will preclude the opportunity for good eye
contact with the jurors.") (emphasis added).
106. MAUET, supra note 2, at 49. See DUBIN & GUERNSEY, supra note 92, at 42 ("Where
possible ... it may create a warmer, more trusting atmosphere to stand in front of the first row of
jurors or to the side of the podium.") (emphasis added).
107. "The ideal closing argument is organized, planned and delivered without notes. A reliance
on notes relegates a closing argument into a formal speech .... Reading notes will preclude the
opportunity for good eye contact with the jurors." Id. at 173 (emphasis added).
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Modem and classical authorities part ways on the subject of non-
verbal communication. Modem authorities place far greater emphasis on
non-verbal methods of creating and projecting credibility. Relying on the
recent work of psychologists, modem authorities emphasize non-verbal
communication such as eye contact, posture, voice inflection, etc. much
more than their predecessors.
VI. Arguments from Emotion
In their analysis of how emotion affects persuasive discourse,
modem authorities differ somewhat from their classical counterparts.
Even though classical rhetoricians preferred appeals to reason, they
recognized the powerful persuasive effect of appeals to emotion. Even
so, they disapproved of appeals to emotion because emotion impairs the
audience's ability to reach a well-reasoned decision. While modem
experts also recognize that emotion may impair the audience's ability to
reason logically, they are more tolerant of nonrational "reasoning" than
their predecessors.
In part, this tolerance springs from modem research regarding the
nonlogical ways people "reason" or think. Many modem authorities, for
instance, believe that, "most people are affective, not cognitive, thinkers.
That is, most people are emotional, symbol-oriented, selective perceivers
of information who base their decisions largely on previously held
attitudes about people and events."'' 8
This explanation is simply another way of describing how emotion
and reasoning are inevitably intermingled. Moreover, given this
explanation of the reasoning process, appeals to an audience's emotions
are, in one sense, appeals to reason. Thus, even if an advocate's
arguments are logical and "well-reasoned", the audience's affective
response may be stronger than its cognitive response. Consequently,
appeals to emotion become unavoidable and just as important as appeals
to reason.
Despite different analytical approaches, classical and modem
authorities agree that persuasive discourse depends on controlling the
audience's emotions and the emotional climate of the trial. And, like
their predecessors, modem authorities recognize that this emotional
climate fluctuates during the trial. At the beginning, for example, jurors
are anxious, curious, receptive, and looking for someone to trust. 9
108. MAUET, supra note 2, at 25 (emphasis added).
109. Id. at 42.
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They are also more likely to be interested and attentive."' By the end
of the trial, however, both the judge and the jury will be tired, perhaps
bored, and occasionally confused."' Good advocates realize this and
vary their arguments depending on which part of the trial is taking place.
A. Voir Dire and Opening Statements
Beginning with jury selection and their opening statement,
experienced advocates try to set the emotional tone of the trial and begin
to orchestrate the audience's emotions. As the preceding analysis has
shown, the emotional tone of the case is closely connected to the
advocate's credibility. Because of this connection, modem authorities
recommend that advocates relieve jury anxiety during voir dire and
"become the jurors' friend and guide by helping them understand the trial
system, by reassuring them that they do belong here, and by letting them
know that their participation is important to [them] and [their] party."" 2
Moreover, modem experts point out that "voir dire examination is
arguably your best contact with the jurors ... [T]his is the only phase at
which you can speak with them. During the questioning, you can engage
in a dialogue with the jury and develop personal rapport with them.""'
This emotional rapport is especially important during the advocate's
opening statement. Both classical and modem authorities agree that a
strong and emotionally engaging opening statement may determine the
outcome of the case. In fact, some modem authorities believe that "80%
of jurors make up their minds during opening and never change their
opinions."' "
Modem analyses of opening statements resemble classical analyses
of exordia in that both stress the importance of first impressions; "As in
life generally, the psychological phenomenon of primacy applies, and
110. CARLSON & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 103, at 40.
111. MAUET, supra note 2, at 277. See also DUBIN & GUERNSEY, supra note 92, at 177.
112. MAUET, supra note 2, at 23. See also DUBIN & GUERNSEY, supra note 92, at 20 ("A
legitimate and significant goal of voir dire is to begin the process of establishing your credibility to
the prospective jurors.") and Perlman, supra note 90, at 49 ("[Jurors] are suddenly thrust into a
totally unfamiliar and intimidating atmosphere in which they are unsure what is expected of them.
They have a deep-seated need for guidance, self assurance, and recognition of their involvement in
the process.").
113. CARLSON & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 103, at 40.
114. Id. at 64 (citing Jossen, Opening Statements: Win it in the Opening, 10 THE DOCKET 1, 6
(1986). The authors dispute Jossen's assertion which is based on findings of the Chicago Jury
Project in the 1960's, but add that "common sense and psychological theory point to the importance
of the opening . I..." ld. See also, MAUET, supra note 2, at 4 ("Lawyers know the importance of
a good opening statement. Research has shown that most jurors return verdicts that are consistent
with their impressions made during the opening statements.").
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initial impressions become lasting impressions." ' Moreover, a good
opening should "heighten" the jury's attention." ' For the most part,
these first impressions come from the advocate's overview of the case
and from the statement of the facts.
B. Statement of the Facts
Like their predecessors, modern experts think that advocates should
use the emotional facts of the case to predispose the judge and jury in the
client's favor. To accomplish this, they recommend that the "story...
focus on the people, not the problem. Most jurors view the world
through emotional eyes. They are interested in people and what makes
them do the things they do . . . . Personalizing [the] client or key
witness is important because jurors want to help people they like.""'
The advocate's storytelling style is also an important tool for
exploiting the audience's emotions "your storytelling should be emotional
and dramatic, since you want to draw the jurors into your story and
create empathy for your party. Vivid, dramatic, emotional storytelling is
engaging and keeps the jury's attention.
" 8
Although they tend to concentrate on the jurors, modern analysts
also note that while "the judge may know a good deal about the law
governing the case; and the judge may even have presided at similar trials
in the past. . ., the judge may be a complete stranger to the facts in the
instant case.""' 9  Consequently, like lay jurors, judges may be
responsive to the emotional aspects of the case and advocates should
narrate the facts with this in mind.
C. Closing Argument
Like the classical rhetoricians, modern authorities attach a great deal
of importance to the closing argument and regard it as one of the best
opportunities for playing on the court's emotions. Ideally, a good closing
115. MAUET, supra note 2, at 41. See also DuBiN & GUERNSEY, supra note 92, at 33
("Psychologists tell us that what we hear first and last have the persuasive impact on us. If you, as
plaintiff's counsel make an effective opening statement, immediately after it the jury should want to
find for your client.").
116. MAUET, surpa note 2, at 44. This function is similar to that served by the classical partitio
or argument summary.
117. Id. at at 43 (emphasis added). See also id. at 4 ("Most opening statements are based on
storytelling, usually giving a chronological overview of "what happened" from either the plaintiff's
or the defendant's viewpoint . ").
118. Id. at 43 (emphasis added).
119. CARLSON & IMWtNKELRIED, supra note 103, at 65.
99 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW FALL 1994
argument is "logic and emotion brought together."' 2° They stress that
closing argument gives advocates an opportunity for demonstrating their
own emotional involvement with the case, but warn that "[sihowing
honest emotion does not mean crying or other histrionics. Rather, it
means ...demonstrat[ing] the appropriate emotional response to the
content of the closing argument whether it be sadness, happiness, anger
or indignation."'' They also note that "the delivery style that
accomplishes this is as varied as trial lawyers are numerous. Some
lawyers are emotional and passionate; other quietly compelling ...",'
Ever mindful of the audience, they frequently remind advocates that
a closing argument should not be so long that it bores or confuses the
audience.'23 And, given the audience's limited attention span, "key
ideas should be repeated, since repetition is so important for
retention."""
Although most authorities regard the closing as a good place for
emotional argument, some of them warn advocates about the attendant
dangers,
Psychological studies show that appeals to reason are better than
appeals to emotion. They [are] ...more lasting. [V]ery strong
emotions block out almost completely the ability to reason. [I]f a
person is caught up in a storm of emotion, he will have ... little
memory of what was said. He remembers his feelings about the
subject matter, but he will not be in a position to defend those
feelings in the jury room. 2'
To summarize, modem authorities like their classical predecessors,
stress sensitivity to and use of the fluctuating emotional climate of the
case. They too urge advocates to exploit the audience's emotions
120. MAUET, supra note 2, at 278.
121. DuBIN & GUERNSEY, supra note 92, at 174.
122. MAUEr, supra note 2, at 284.
123. DUBIN & GUERNSEY, supra note 92, at 177 ("What you do not want is an argument longer
than necessary. Do not either bore or confuse the jurors.") (emphasis added). See also MAUET,
supra note 2, at 9 ("Most [closing arguments] last 30-60 minutes. If too short, they fail to use the
available time persuasively. If too long, they run the danger of boring or irritating the jury.")
(emphasis added).
124. MAUET, supra note 2, at 279. Cicero and Quintilian who thought that repetition betrayed
a lack of confidence in the judge.
125. CARLSON & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 103, at 229. See also Speiser, supra note 101, at
243 ("One thing must always be kept in mind: overuse of emotional appeal may be disastrous. Loud,
bombastic oratory should never be used. When emotion is used, it must be natural and sincere. If
you switch into a highly theatrical delivery, the jury may interpret the emotional appeal as a
substitute for reason or a screen for lack of confidence.").
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strategically, depending on what stage of the trial (voir dire, opening
statement, closing argument, etc.) is taking place.
The modem tolerance of emotion's place in persuasive discourse
represents the biggest difference between classical and modem
approaches. In part, this tolerance springs from modem experts'
conviction that most people reason in an affective (emotional, symbol-
oriented), rather than a cognitive, fashion. In addition, modem experts
stress the overlapping effects of emotion and lawyer credibility much
more than classical rhetoricians did.
VI. Conclusion
In their systematic and comprehensive analysis of legal discourse,
Greco-Roman rhetoricians divided legal argument into three equal
components: logos, pathos, and ethos. Even though they understood the
importance of logic, they realized that judges and juries also make their
decisions based on nonrational factors such as their sense of the
advocate's personal integrity or the emotional content of the case.
Taking these factors into account, classical rhetoricians devoted as much
attention to these nonrational means of persuasion as they did to logic.
For them, advocacy was an art and could only be learned by
practice. Using examples drawn from their own considerable experience,
they emphasized audience assessment techniques, strategic approaches,
recurring problems, and the importance of flexibility. Above all, they
stressed the importance of projecting the advocate's personal integrity and
exploiting the emotional climate of the case. Their overall approach was
focused on humanizing the case in ways that would favorably affect the
judge's decision.
Modem analysts, especially trial advocacy specialists, also realize the
importance of ethos and pathos in persuasive discourse. In their
discussions of trial strategy, they implicitly (and sometimes explicitly)
endorse classical rhetorical principles and discuss many of the same
topics as classical rhetoricians. Very often, they reach the same
conclusions about what is effective and what is not. Of course, modem
lawyers must sometimes modify classical principles to suit modem
circumstances. For example, both classical and modem rhetoricians think
an audience-oriented focus is important. But modem trial lawyers have
a more difficult task than their predecessors because they they have two
audiences-the judge (a professional) and the jury (nonprofessionals).
Despite this difference, both modem and classical rhetoricians agree that
advocates must tailor their arguments to suit the audience and make
numerous suggestions about how to do so.
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Occasionally, modem authorities adopt an altogether different
emphasis such as when they focus on non-verbal persuasive techniques.
Or, when they depend on affective reasoning instead of cognitive
reasoning. Even then, however, they are drawing on principles which
were first introduced in the classical treatises.
Although there are substantial similarities between Greco-Roman and
modem ideas of how pathos and ethos affect legal audiences, modem
authorities do not discuss these effects in a very systematic fashion.
Compared to their predecessors, modem analysts lack an adequate
overarching theoretical framework within which to discuss the nonrational
factors in legal discourse. This lack of a systematic approach presents
several dangers. First, it results in an over-emphasis on logic in most
formal analyses of persuasive legal discourse. It also misleadingly
relegates ethos and pathos to positions of secondary importance.
Moreover, new trial lawyers do not have ready access to the available
materials regarding ethos and pathos. Instead, they must glean their
information from journal articles, parts of trial advocacy treatises, and
from more experienced lawyers.
To correct this deficiency, modem experts should familiarize
themselves with the rhetorical works of Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian.
After doing so, they could utilize 2,000 year old treatises which provide
an experience-based theoretical framework within which to place the
essential rhetorical principles of ethos and pathos. By modifying these
treatises for modem use, they would provide new lawyers with an
invaluable resource.
